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FREEDOM AND SERVITUDE: 
 
THE MASTER AND SLAVE DIALECTIC IN HEGEL’S 
 
PHENOMENOLOGY OF SPIRIT 
 
ADAM L. FRENCH 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
The recognition of the other and how the other affects our individual, free self- 
consciousness, is explained by Hegel in the dialectic of the master-slave relationship.  In 
Hegel’s view, self-consciousness is a self-consciousness only by existing for another self-
consciousness. Hegel makes it clear that the relation between individual, independent, 
and free, self-consciousnesses is needed for the freedom of all self-consciousness.   This 
process first exhibits the side of the inequality of the two, one self-consciousness only 
recognizing, the other self- consciousness being only recognized, the master and the 
slave.  When the slave submits to the master, the master does not directly relate to the 
slave.  What really confronts the master is not an independent consciousness, but a 
dependent one, although it is in his labor that the slave transforms servitude into mastery.  
Since the master’s desires are fulfilled by the slave in the things the slave produces, the 
master becomes dependent on the slave and is no longer an independent self-
consciousness.  The slave then recognizes he no longer needs the master to fulfill his 
development as a free self-consciousness. The master must thus come to acknowledge 
this in the slave and learn to map his own point of view on that of the slave who is 
emerging as independent.  We come to understand both why the situation of mastery and 
slavery emerges, why it is inadequate as a stance of free self-consciousness and why 
  v 
mutual recognition alone will lead us to free self-consciousnesses discovered in a social 
community consisting of independent, free individuals. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
The Phenomenology of Spirit has as its ultimate goal the realization of Universal 
Spirit an “‘I’ that is ‘We’ and a ‘We’ that is an I’”(PhG 177).  One of the most important 
aspects of that journey is the development of free self-consciousness.  Hegel claims that 
“consciousness of a thing (is) possible only for a self-consciousness”(PhG 165) because 
we only come to Understanding and knowledge through a kind of self-reflection.  For 
Hegel, the truth, or knowledge, of objects (the concern of consciousness) depends on self-
consciousness. Yet self-consciousness, in Hegel’s view, is something that requires an 
awareness of an other self.  “It is true that consciousness of an ‘other’, of an object in 
general, is itself necessarily self-consciousness, a reflectedness-into-self, consciousness 
of itself in otherness”(PhG 164). The relations that explain the social status of Spirit can 
only be brought to be by the unit y of different self-consciousnesses, who in their 
community recognize each other as free agents held together by beliefs, laws, and culture.  
How one can be concretely free in reference to an other is Hegel’s main concern; 
freedom, in this view, is an embodied, collective thinking.  We learn about this collective 
thinking b y investigating the study of the normative relations that explain our conscious 
world.  As Jean Hyppolite notes, when empirical understanding knows its object, or 
nature, and through experience discovers the multiplicity of the particular laws of nature, 
it fancies that it knows an other than itself.  But the reflection of this understanding shows 
that this knowledge of an other is possible only through a unit y in which the conditions of 
the object, of nature, are the very conditions of knowing this nature.  “In knowing nature, 
then, understanding knows itself; its knowledge of an other is a self-knowledge, a 
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knowledge of knowledge” (Hyppolite 143). 
In the chapter discussing self-consciousness in the Phenomenology of Spirit, 
Hegel will explain the development of ‘consciousness’ becoming ‘self-consciousness’ by 
emphasizing the importance of the development of the individual self-consciousness 
which is essential, and necessary, to have mutual recognition in the social community. 
So, the pursuit of knowledge will, as a result of this chapter’s claims, be reconceived as 
participation in a social practice or institution, a rule-governed, collective, teleological 
activity. And, as we shall see in detail, given this reconstrual, assessing the rationality o f 
such practices will ultimately involve considering such self-consciously held criteria as, in 
effect, social nor ms, possible bases for what Hegel will call ‘mutual recognition ’(Pippin 
147). 
 
It ma y seem ironic that the first instance when the freedom of the individual self- 
consciousness begins to be actualized is in its recognition of another independent self- 
consciousness.  But, even in the initial stages of Hegel’s discussion of self-consciousness, 
an other is needed to begin this developmental process of consciousness to become an 
individual self-consciousness.  “The relation to the other is thus double-edged in that the 
other both affirms and undermines the subject’s sense of himself, and it is this double-
edged quality that leads to the dialectic of the dependence and independence that 
structures the discussion of master y and servitude”(Pinkard 54). This recognition of the 
other and its importance for the freedom of individual self-consciousnesses is explained 
by Hegel in the dialectic of the master-slave relationship.  As John Russon claims, we can 
learn a great deal from the slave’s situation about the nature of the hermeneutical 
character of human existence, both because of the hermeneutical dimensions definitive of 
the slave’s existence and because of what the slave is defined as lacking, his freedom.  
“To recognize another person is precisely to recognize within the field of one’s own 
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experience another perspective: in recognizing another we recognize one for whom we 
ourselves count as an other” (Russson 35).  To recognize an other is to recognize that I 
also have a being-for-other because being-in-itself and being-for-other cannot be held 
apart, we see that our identity is not our possession alone, but is dependent upon how I 
am recognized by others.  This notion of property involves other determinations, and this 
is why Russon claims the hermeneutical situation of the slave reveals to us that the only 
way we can be objective is through mutually recognizing established systems of equal 
recognition.  But because of the dimensions surrounding the slave’s existence, we will 
soon see that it is really he who has attained his freedom in the world. 
In the following pages, we will investigate this development of self-consciousness 
that takes place in sections 166-196 of the Phenomenology of Spirit that will lead to the 
free self-consciousness that arises in the “Independence and Dependence of Self- 
Consciousness” sections, particularly focusing on the developments of the master-slave 
relationship that takes place in the “Lordship and Bondage” section of the 
Phenomenology of Spirit , in sections 178-196.  This is where we will begin to see that the 
free self-consciousness is developed through relation to the other free self-
consciousnesses found in the social contexts of the community. The development of this 
free self- consciousness out of the master-slave relationship will allow the individual to 
achieve mutual recognition from all in the form of Universal Spirit. 
The “free” self-consciousness that emerges as a result of the master-slave dialectic 
must then pass through the development stages of Stoicism, Skepticism and the Unhappy 
Consciousness to arrive at Universal Spirit, becoming a truly free self-consciousness in 
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the social community.  Stoicism will represent a “masterly” attempt to simply negate the 
world in realizing the actual independence of the slave and retreating to “pure thought”, 
and skepticism represents a demonstration that there is nothing worth believing or doing, 
and that is why the master really has no superiority.  Hegel will then show that the 
skeptical attempt to establish such independence is self-negating, leading ultimately to 
what Hegel calls the Unhappy Consciousness.  Only with the mutual recognition of other 
self-consciousnesses in a social community will self-consciousness find a contentment 
and satisfaction that concludes with the philosophical science of pure thought; and 
become an ‘I’ that is ‘We’ and a ‘We’ that is ‘I’. 
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CHAPTER I 
The Beginning of Self-Consciousness’ Self Certainty 
In the previous modes of certainty that come before the beginning of self-
consciousness, what was true for consciousness was something other than itself, an 
external object.  What the object was in itself – mere being in sense-certainty, the 
concrete thing of perception, and the force of the Understanding – proves in truth not to 
be any of these.  Just as sense-certainty appears to us at first to be the immediate, and 
truest form of knowledge, this knowledge is then transformed to perception and 
understanding.  The transformation, understanding, and growth of what first appears as 
consciousness must develop into self-consciousness to be true knowledge of 
consciousness, and the true knowledge of other objects that begins with self-
consciousness. In sense-certainty we learn that we exist as ‘thises’.  The certainty of the 
‘I’ is mediated, or is actualized, through something else, an external thing or object.  
Consciousness will come to see that the only way to gain certainty of itself, become a 
self-consciousness, is not through this relation, or mediation, with another thing, or 
object, but can only be actualized through another self-consciousness, another 
independent individual consciousness, an other. 
 Consciousness simultaneously distinguishes itself from something, and at the 
same time relates itself to it.  This something exists for consciousness; and the 
determinate aspect of this relating, or the being of something for a consciousness, is 
knowing.  In consciousness one thing exists for another, this other is to consciousness not 
merely for it, but is also outside of this relationship since it exists for itself, not merely as 
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a mental image, but exists beyond consciousness as an object.  It is important to 
remember, as Hegel himself notes, that the investigation of these two moments, ‘Notion’ 
and ‘object’, the ‘being-for-another’ of consciousness and the ‘being-in-itself’ of the 
thing, or the objects idea of itself, both fall within this knowledge that is consciousness.  
“For consciousness is, on the one hand, consciousness of the object, and on the other, 
consciousness of itself; consciousness of what for it is the True, and consciousness of its 
knowledge of the truth.  Since both are for the same consciousness, this consciousness is 
itself their comparison; it is for this same consciousness to know whether its knowledge 
of the object corresponds to the object or not” (PhG 85).  In going through this process of 
the moments of its development – Sense-certainty, Perception, Force and the 
Understanding – consciousness will arrive at a point at which it gets rid of its semblance 
of being burdened with something alien, with what is only for it and some sort of ‘other’, 
at a point where appearance becomes identical with essence, where consciousness grasps 
its own essence in absolute knowledge itself.  This movement is characterized by the 
reflection not on the structure of things of which we are conscious, but on the structure of 
our conscious attending to these things. 
The knowledge, or knowing, that begins this process for consciousness is found 
in sense-certainty, a knowledge of the immediate, or what simply is.  We start by 
receiving the object as it appears to us and this is why sense-certainty seems to be the 
truest kind of knowledge because it has yet to omit anything from the object, but has 
the object before it in its perfect entirety.  But, this very certainty proves itself to be the 
most abstract and poorest truth because all it tells us about the object is just that it is.  
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“It is; this is the essential point of sense-knowledge, and this pure being constitutes its 
truth”(PhG 91).  But when we examine this pure being which constitutes the essence of 
this certainty, we find that an actual sense-certainty is not merely this pure immediacy, 
but only an instance of it. 
Sense-certainty, then, though indeed expelled from the object as knowledge of 
another object different then the ‘I’, has the force of its truth in the ‘I’, the immediacy of 
m y seeing or hearing is prevented because ‘I’ hold them fast by pointing to, or 
mentioning, these objects.  “Sense-certainty thus comes to know by experience that its 
essence is neither in the object nor the ‘I’, and that its immediacy is neither an immediacy 
of the one nor of the other; for in both, what I mean is rather something unessential, and 
the object and the ‘I’ are universals in which that ‘Now’ and ‘Here’ and ‘I’ which I mean 
do not have a continuing being, or are not” (PhG 103). This is why sense-certainty is 
always reaching this same result, learning from experience these truths about objects, but 
equally always forgetting these truths and needing to start the movement all over again to 
gain this knowledge. 
Immediate certainty does not take over the truth, for its truth is the universal.  
Sense-certainty wants to apprehend the This.  Perception, on the other hand, takes what is 
present to it as universal.  “The wealth of sense-knowledge belongs to perception, not to 
immediate certainty, for which it was only the source of instances; for only perception, 
contains negation, that is, difference or manifoldness, within its own essence”(PhG 112).  
The This is established as not This, as something superseded which preserves the sense-
element of consciousness but not as immediate certainty, but as a universal which will be 
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defined as a property of the object by consciousness’ perception. The sensuous 
universality, or the immediate unit y of being and the negative, is thus a property only 
when the One and the pure universality are developed from it and differentiated from each 
other.  The self-conscious ‘I’ is also universal like the original object of consciousness.  
This in-itself turns out to be a mode in which the object is only for an other.  The Notion 
of object is superseded in the actual object where the immediate presentation of the object 
is superseded by consciousness because the object is seen as existing only for the purpose 
of this consciousness.  The supersession of the object, consciousness, takes place between 
self-consciousnesses. 
As Hegel presents it in the chapter on Perception, the object that we perceive 
presents itself as a One, but we also perceive in this object a property that is universal, and 
which transcends the singularity of this object.  Therefore, my initial perception of the 
object obtained through sense-certainty of the first being of the objective essence as a One 
was not its true being.  “But since the object is what is true, the untruth falls in me; my 
apprehension was not correct.  On account of the universality of the property, I must 
rather take the objective essence to be on the whole a community.  I now further perceive 
the property to be determinate, opposed to another and excluding it”(PhG 117).  Only 
when this object belongs to a One is it a property, and only in relation to others is it 
determinate.  This return of consciousness into itself, which is directly associated with the 
pure apprehension of the object, alters the truth. 
Consciousness now recognizes this perception as its own and takes responsibility 
for it and by doing so consciousness will obtain the true object in its plurality, being-in-
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itself and being-for-another.  Consciousness also recognizes that it is the untruth 
occurring in perception of the object that falls within it.  “By this very recognition it is 
able at once to supersede this untruth; it distinguishes this apprehension of the truth from 
the untruth of its perception, corrects this untruth, and since it undertakes to make this 
correction itself, the truth, qua truth of perception, falls of course within consciousness” 
(PhG 118). 
Consciousness now begins to realize itself as a One, a being in its own right, a 
self-consciousness.  Consciousness can now be seen as an ‘object’ for itself by its 
association with objects, with an ‘other’.  This consciousness no longer merely 
perceives objects of the world, but is also conscious of its reflection into itself.  Our 
experience of the object is that it exhibits itself for the consciousness that is 
apprehending it, but it is at the same time reflected out of the way in which it presents 
itself to consciousness and back into itself.  In this reflection the object contains in its 
own self an opposite truth to that which it has for the apprehending consciousness.  “In 
the dialectic of sense-certainty, Seeing and Hearing have been lost to consciousness; 
and, as perception, consciousness has arrived at thoughts, which brings together for the 
first time the unconditioned universal” (PhG 132).  This unconditioned universal, which 
is now the true object of consciousness, is still just an object for it; consciousness has 
not yet grasped the Notion of the unconditioned as Notion.  For consciousness, the 
object has returned into itself from its relation to an other and has thus become Notion in 
principle, but consciousness is not yet for itself the Notion and consequently does not 
recognize itself in that reflected object.  For us, this object has developed through the 
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movement of consciousness in such a way that consciousness is involved in that 
development.  In this movement consciousness had for its content merely the objective 
essence and not consciousness as such which leaves consciousness shrinking away 
from what has emerged, and takes it as the essence in the objective sense. 
To the Understanding this movement, that was found in the experience of 
sense- certainty and perception, is here a mere happening, and the selfsame and 
the unlike are predicates, whose essence is an inert substance. 
“What is, for the Understanding, an object in a sensuous covering, is for us in its essential 
form as a pure Notion. The exposition of its Notion belongs to Science; but 
consciousness, in the way that it immediately has this Notion, again comes on the scene as 
a form belonging to consciousness itself, or as a new shape of consciousness, which does 
not recognize in what has gone before its own essence, but looks on it as something quite 
different. Consciousness is for its own self, it is a distinguishing of that which contains 
no difference, or self-consciousness” (PhG 164). 
 
If we call Notion what the object is in itself, and call the object what it is which is 
an object for an other, then it is clear that being-in-itself and being-for-an-other are one 
and the same.  It is for consciousness that the in-itself of the object, and the being of the 
object for an other, are one and the same.  Self-consciousness is the reflection out of the 
world that is recognized by consciousness through sense and perception, and is the return 
of consciousness into itself from this otherness.  This standpoint of consciousness is 
integrated into this new, more reflexive conception of what counts as knowledge, and this 
new standpoint is what Hegel terms “self-consciousness”.  Certain structures of the mind 
must be in place in order to have a sensible understanding of the world, and it is by 
investigating these structures, we can find out what the objective world is really like, but 
we can never know how the world might look to an other conscious subject which makes 
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the world of experience only appearance.  “It is the thing that reflects itself back on itself 
and is different for-itself from what it is for-another (specifically, for our consciousness)” 
(Hyppolite 115).  The thing, as we have said, is at once for-itself and for-another – two 
diverse beings – and it is different for-itself from what it is for-an-other. For the in-itself 
is consciousness; but equally it is that for which an other (the in- itself) is; and it is for 
consciousness that the in-itself of the object, and the being of the object for an other, are 
one and the same.  “Natural consciousness loses its truth: what it took to be authentic real 
knowledge is revealed to it as nonreal knowledge.  In the course of its development, 
consciousness loses not only what it held to be true from the theoretical point of view, but 
also its own view of life and of being, its intuition of the world” (Hyppolite 13). Opposed 
to an other, the ‘I’ is its own self, and at the same time it overarches this other, which, for 
the ‘I’, is equally only the ‘I’ itself. 
The being of what is merely ‘meant’, the singleness and the universality opposed 
to it of perception, as also the empty inner being of the Understanding, are all no longer 
essences, but rather moments of self-consciousness, and are purely vanishing essences. 
The two moments that self-consciousness now has before itself are a self-conscious being 
conscious of a world of sensuously perceived objects that exist independently of him, and 
a self-conscious being aware of itself as a position in “social space”.  Our object is this 
movement now, instead of grasping only this object, we must grasp our movement of this 
account of the object that presents itself to us.  But self-consciousness is the reflection out 
of the being of the world of sense and perception, and is essentially the return from 
otherness.  Consciousness’ knowledge is always knowledge of an object; and if by 
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concept we mean the subjective side of knowledge and b y object its objective side, its 
truth, then knowledge is the movement of self-transcendence which goes from concept to 
object.  To know ourselves we first must investigate the objects of the world, how we 
relate to them and how they relate to ourselves. Our conceptual knowledge becomes 
objective knowledge b y using our knowledge of the world as a beginning in coming to a 
state of self-knowledge, self-awareness, and self-consciousness.  As Terry Pinkard notes, 
self-consciousness is our awareness of our taking things as such, our conscious reflection 
of things, and by doing so is assuming a position in a “social space”.  “Consciousness 
requires that we have a position in ‘social space’, and self-consciousness is the awareness 
of this position, of what we are and are not licensed to infer” (Pinkard 47). 
The conception of “consciousness” that precedes and begins the first three 
sections of consciousness, Sense-Certainty, Perception, and the Understanding of the 
Phenomenology of Spirit, is the picture of ourselves in relation to the world that sees that 
relation in terms of a dualism between object and subject.  But, as Hyppolite claims, the 
Phenomenology of Spirit shows, precisely, that this opposition is reversible.  The object 
is the concept for consciousness, and the concept is the knowledge of itself, the self-
consciousness of knowledge.  As self-consciousness, it is movement; but since what it 
distinguishes from itself is only itself as itself, the difference, as an otherness, is 
immediately superseded for it; the difference is not, and self-consciousness is only the 
motionless tautology of ‘I am I’.  The ‘I’ distinguishes itself from itself and in doing so 
this ‘I’ is directly aware that what is distinguished from itself is not different from itself. 
This movement takes us away from the subject and object model of knowledge to an 
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understanding of self-consciousness – an understanding of how ‘we’ relate to the world 
depends on how ‘we’ understand ourselves to be.  This ‘I’, the selfsame being, repels 
itself from itself; but what is posited as distinct from this ‘I’, or unlike the ‘I’, in being so 
distinguished, is not a distinction from the ‘I’.  “It is true that consciousness of an ‘other’, 
of an object in general, is itself necessarily self-consciousness, a reflectedness-into-itself, 
consciousness of itself in its otherness.  The necessary advance from the previous shapes 
of consciousness for which their truth was a Thing, an ‘other’ that themselves, expresses 
just this, that not only is consciousness of a thing possible only for self-consciousness, 
but that self-consciousness alone is the truth of those shapes” (PhG 163).  But since the 
difference that began this movement, which is the reflection of our subjective and 
objective knowledge, does not have the form of being, it is not self-consciousness.  It is 
only for us that this truth exists, not yet for consciousness.  Hence otherness is for it in the 
form of a being separate from itself, from self-consciousness, or as a distinct moment, but 
there is also for consciousness the unit y of itself with this difference as a second distinct 
moment.  The independence of the other and the unit y with the other, since self- 
consciousness knows this other as an appearance, are now realized to be one and the same 
for self-consciousness.  To the extent that consciousness is independent, so too is its 
object, but only implicitly. 
The external world exists, it ‘has the form of a being’, as Hegel puts it, but its determinacy, 
its ‘differences’, are as variable and undetermined as, at this point, the undetermined second 
moment. It is in this sense that Hegel can say, in proposing the topic he is to explain and 
justify, that the ‘being’ of sense certainty, the ‘universality’ of Perception, and the ‘empty 
inner being of the understanding’ are now no longer ‘essences’, but are to be understood as 
‘moments of self-consciousness’”(Pippin 145). 
 
Hegel claims with that first moment of sense-certainty in the relation to objects of 
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the world, self-consciousness is in the form of consciousness, and the whole expanse of 
the sensuous world is preserved for it, but at the same time only as connected with the 
second moment, the unity of self-consciousness with itself; and hence the sensuous world 
is for it an enduring existence which is only appearance, or a difference which, it in 
itself, is no difference.  As was mentioned earlier, certain structures of the mind must be 
in place in order to have a sensible understanding of the world, so objectivity precedes 
our subjectivity in the world.  “Thus the standpoint of ‘consciousness’ is integrated into 
this new, more reflective conception of what counts as knowledge, which Hegel terms 
quite generally, ‘self-consciousness’” (Pinkard 46).  This standpoint of reflection that is 
self-consciousness is characterized by a reflection not on the structure of the things about 
which we are conscious, but on the structure of our conscious attendings and takings 
themselves.  Because this structure comes from the conscious subject, us, we can 
investigate it just b y self-reflection; since we possess these structures we can investigate 
them.  “Consciousness is taken as it offers itself, and it offers itself as a relation to the 
other – object, world or nature.  It is quite true that this knowledge of the other is a self-
knowledge.  But it is no less true that this self-knowledge is a knowledge of the other, a 
knowledge of the world.  To understand what we take to be valid claims of knowledge is 
to come to understand the kind of person we take ourselves to have become.  Thus we 
discover in the various objects of consciousness what consciousness is itself; ‘The world 
is the mirror in which we discover ourselves’” (Hyppolite 20).  It seems that one’s self- 
consciousness in being recognized as independent is only possible – only sustainable, 
does not undermine itself – by having his conception of himself mirrored back to him in 
  
15 
the acts of recognition from another self-consciousness. 
The object is a One, reflected into itself; it is for itself, but it is also for another. 
The different objects of the world are thus established as existing on their own account 
and the conflict between them is so far reciprocal that each is different, not from or in 
itself, but only from the other.  The object is posited as being for-itself, or as the absolute 
negation of all otherness.  “Therefore as purely self-related negation; but the negation that 
is self-related is the suspension of itself; in other words, the Thing has its essential being 
in another Thing” (PhG 126). The object is now in one and the same respect the 
opposite of itself because it is for itself, so far as it is for an other, and it is for an other, 
so far as it is for itself. 
The antithesis that now appears before us that we will see become the being-for-
itself of the master and the being-for-another of the slave together require an 
understanding that is to recognize a multiplicity as a unit y, to see a multiple being-for-
another as the expression of a single being-for-self.  What self-consciousness 
distinguishes from itself as having being, also has in it, in so far as it is posited as being, 
not merely the character of sense-certainty and perception, but it is being that is reflected 
into itself.  For the in-itself, or the universal result of the relation of the Understanding to 
the inwardness of things, is the distinguishing of what is not to be distinguished, or the 
unity of what is distinguished.  But this unit y is, as we have seen, just as much its 
repulsion from itself; and this Notion separates itself into the antithesis of self-
consciousness and life; the former is the unit y for which the infinite of the differences is; 
the latter, however, is only this unit y itself, so that it is not at the same time for itself. To 
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the extent, then, that consciousness is independent, so too is its object, but only implicitly. 
“Although, as ‘self-consciousness’, he takes himself to determine for himself what can 
count as a reason for him, and thus to be independent, as an organic subject, he finds that 
his desires are often simply given to him, and that he is completely dependent on his 
organic nature (on ‘life’) to determine what desires he will have and which ones demand 
satisfaction”(Pinkard 50).  Those desires that one determines to pursue, which ends to 
satisfy, are the results of the collective, historical, social subject’s self-determination and 
have no independent, natural status.  This is why the necessity of the experience which 
consciousness enters into presents itself in two lights, or two necessities.  The necessity of 
the negation of the object, effected by consciousness itself in its experience and in the 
testing of its knowledge, and the necessity of the appearance of the new object which 
takes shape through the prior experience. 
As we have seen, consciousness begins with the self’s or the ‘I’s’, relation to an 
other in the form of an external object.  The development of self-consciousness now 
begins with the relation to an other in the form of an external object, except now that 
object has become an other self-consciousness. 
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CHAPTER II 
The Certainty of Self-Consciousness Found in the ‘Other’  
Self-consciousness is now confronted by what it has come to realize is an ‘other’ 
independent self-consciousness.  But because self-consciousness has returned into itself 
in its own development, it has created a negative relationship to this new independent 
self-consciousness that is presented to it as an ‘other’.  This self-consciousness has not 
realized the existence of this independent self-consciousness, but this presence of the 
other is only recognized as a one-sided relationship, in that this otherness only exists for 
itself, for the initial self-consciousness.  We have yet to come to understand that our 
otherness is for an other and it is only in recognizing this that we truly become an 
independent self-consciousness.  Self-consciousness is thus certain of itself only b y 
superseding this other that presents itself to self- consciousness as an independent self.  
Certain of the nothingness of this other, it explicitly affirms that this nothingness is for it 
the truth of the other; it destroys the independent object and thereby gives itself the 
certainty of itself as a true certainty, a certainty which has become something produced for 
itself. 
In this satisfaction, experience makes it aware that the object has its own 
independence. Consciousness needs an other object to begin to realize its own self, 
consciousness desires an other object to realize its own self.  As defined b y John Russon, 
the very nature of desire is that it must determine reality, this being the definition of desire 
for consciousness.  Its very nature, therefore, is such as to require an other, a field of 
operations, a receptacle for its determining power.  Though desire will not explicitly 
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acknowledge an other, it is only as a relation to some other that desire can be.  Desire, 
therefore, constantly faces another that it must deny.  Desire and the self-certainty 
obtained in its gratification, are conditioned by the object, for self-certainty comes from 
superseding this other; in order that this supersession can take place, there must be this 
other.  “In acting on desire, the subject is said to ‘negate’ the object in that he affirms for 
himself that what is to be done with the object (letting it be or consuming it) is 
determined by him”(Pinkard 51).  Thus self-consciousness, by its negative relation to the 
object, is unable to supersede it; it is really because of that relation that it produces the 
object again and the desire as well.  “It is in fact something other than self-consciousness 
that is the essence of Desire; and through this experience self-consciousness has itself 
realized this truth” (PhG 175). The end point of desire is not, as one might think, a 
sensuous object, which turns out to be only a means for desire, but the unity with the ‘I’ 
itself.  Desire must be looked at differently in its givenness, much as in sense-certainty, 
and we must understand desire in a different way.  The real ‘object’ of self-
consciousness’ desire turns out not to be an object at all, but its desire is most ultimately 
satisfied by something which gives it back itself in all its activity, another ‘subject’.  
Desire seeks itself in the other; man desires recognition from man and this desire for 
recognition is why the dialectic of the master and slave relationship is so important for 
self-consciousness because this relationship is centered on receiving the necessary 
recognition from an other self-consciousness in order to complete one’s own self- 
consciousness’ development. 
On account of the independence of the object, self-consciousness can only 
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achieve satisfaction of its desire when the object itself affects the negation within itself.  
Since the object is in its own self-negation, and in being so is at the same time 
independent, it is consciousness.  In knowing nature, in knowing the objects around itself, 
understanding knows itself; its knowledge of an other is a self-knowledge, a knowledge 
of knowledge.  Knowledge of the world can be seen as a self-knowledge, certainty about 
the other becomes a self-certainty.  The world is “the great mirror” in which 
consciousness discovers itself.  Conceptual activity results in knowledge if it assists in 
the satisfaction of self-consciousness’s desires.  In the sphere of Life, which is the object 
of Desire, negation is present either in an other, through Desire, or as determinateness 
opposed to another indifferent form, or as the inorganic universal nature of Life.  But this 
universal independent nature, in which negation is present as absolute negation, is the 
being-in-itself as such, or the being-in-itself, and together with the being-for- another, as 
self-consciousness.  “Self-consciousness achieves its satisfaction only in another self-
consciousness” (PhG 175).  Since self-consciousness attempts to satisfy its desire by 
negating an object in the supersession of the object to consume the object for itself in 
order to realize the truth of itself, this object then loses its otherness as it is now only seen 
to exist for this self-consciousness, and this desire for a new object is created again and 
again for self-consciousness.  Russon correctly notes that whenever we act on a desire, 
we reshape the world according to ourselves, and thereby demand that this reality 
acknowledge our dominance and independence.  In self-consciousness’ supersession of 
the object to fulfill its desire by consuming the object in seeing the objects existence only 
being for this self-consciousness, the object’s independence and otherness are done away 
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with which leaves self-consciousness seeking a new object to fulfill its desires in 
otherness.  This endless circle never satisfies self-consciousness because this otherness of 
the object is always negated and then superseded in this self-consciousness’ development. 
Self-consciousness that is simply for itself and directly characterizes its object as 
a negative element, or is primarily desire, will therefore, on the contrary, learn through 
experience that the object is independent.  In this first moment self-consciousness is a 
form of consciousness but at the same time it is connected with the second moment 
because its unit y within it is discovered through the other.  Here the antithesis between 
the first and second moments, the appearance of the first moment and the truth discovered 
from the unit y with itself from the second moment, becomes the unit y of self -
consciousness with itself and this unit y must become essential to self-consciousness.  It is 
because of this craving for this unit y self-consciousness is seen to be Desire in general.  
This unit y with itself is only gained through the other.  “Though desire will not explicitly 
acknowledge another, it is only in relation to some other that desire can be” (Russon 62).  
Self-consciousness is desire, but what it desires, although it does not yet know this 
explicitly, is itself; it desires its own desire.  Self-consciousness desires the recognition of 
the independence of the other and the unit y with this ‘other’ since the other is first only 
presented as an appearance for self-consciousness.  Self-consciousness really desires the 
unit y of the first movement with the second movement within itself, in order to know the 
objects of the world not as appearance, but to know them in truth, self-consciousness 
needs to see that it realizes itself in that reflected object.  And that is why it will be able to 
attain itself only through finding another desire, another self-consciousness. 
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Consciousness now as a self-consciousness has a double object before it, the immediate 
object of the first moment in sense-certainty, which for self-consciousness has the 
character of a negative, and the second moment, itself, which is present in the first 
instance only as opposed to the first object.  In this movement, self-consciousness 
removes this antithesis between the two moments and the identity of itself with itself 
becomes clear. 
“Through this reflection into itself of self-consciousness, the object has become 
Life”(PhG 168).  Self-consciousness is Life, Life exists for self-consciousness.  Life is a 
unit y that is pure movement that moves in a tautological manner containing individual 
members that exist within it, so Life in general needs these individual members, people or 
things, to exist. Life is the medium in which self-consciousness experiences and seeks 
itself.  Life constitutes the first truth of self-consciousness and appears as its other.  By 
actively participating in Life, we can sustain our own existence by using, or negating, 
other members (other self-consciousnesses).  “What self-consciousness distinguishes 
from itself as having being, also has in it, in so far as it is posited as being, not merely the 
character of sense-certainty and perception, but it is a being that is reflected into 
itself”(PhG 168), and this is why the object of immediate desire is a living thing.  Self-
consciousness that characterizes its object, an other self-consciousness, as a negative 
element will therefore, on the contrary, learn though experience that the object is 
independent.  It is this very flux as a self-identical independence that in itself is an 
enduring existence that those consciousnesses are reset as distinct members.  These 
independent members are for themselves, but this being-for-itself is no less immediately 
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their reflection into the unit y then this unit y is the splitting up into separate shapes.  This 
independence of the shape, of self-consciousness, appears as something determinate, for 
an other, for the shape is divided within itself; and the supersession of this dividedness 
takes place through an other. 
Since it has been determined through our investigation of Hegel’s dialectic of the 
development of self-consciousness that what self-consciousness desires is a living thing, 
an other self-consciousness, the discussion of Life by Hegel becomes essential in its 
development because all things participate in Life. 
“Life is the universal fluid medium, a passive separating-out of the shapes becomes, just 
by doing so, a movement of those shapes or becomes Life as a process.  The simple 
universal fluid medium is the in- itself, and the difference of the shapes is the other.  But 
this fluid medium itself becomes the other through this difference; for now it is for the 
difference which exists in and for itself, and consequently is the ceaseless movement b y 
which this passive medium is consumed; Life as a living thing” (PhG 171) 
 
A universal exists because of individual members striving for Life, in realizing the 
universal exists in the community, it is recognized that its individual members must also 
exist. What was consumed in this process is the essence, or the individuality, which is 
maintained at the expense of the universal, which gives itself the feeling of its unit y 
within itself by superseding its antithesis to the other by means of which it exists for 
itself.  Since the essence of the individual shape, universal Life, and what exists for itself 
is in itself simple substance, when this substance places the other within itself, it 
supersedes this essence, i.e. it divides it, and this dividedness of the differenceless fluid 
medium is just what establishes individuality. 
Life is the typical universal that is in all things and can be contemplated as a 
phenomenon of one continuous process that we, as individuals, all take part in.  This 
  
23 
independence of the shape appears as something for an other since the shape is divided 
within itself and the supersession of this dividedness takes place through an other.  But 
this supersession is just as much within the shape itself and therefore the shape in its very 
subsistence is a dividedness within itself, or the supersession of its being-for-itself.  “In 
the medium of life, all alterity is provisional, and the appearance of an other is 
immediately resolved into the unit y of the self.  Life, precisely, is this movement that 
reduces the other to itself and discovers itself in that other. This is why Hegel says that 
life is an independence in which the differences of its movement have been resolved” 
(Hyppolite).  Thus the simple substance of Life is the splitting-up of itself into shapes and 
at the same time the dissolution of these existent differences, the dissolution of the 
splitting-up, is just as much a splitting-up as it is a forming of members.  “With this, the 
two sides of the whole movement which before were distinguished, viz. the passive 
separatedness of the shapes in the general medium of independence, and the process of 
Life, collapse into one another” (PhG 171). 
Self-consciousness returns into itself to conceive its own identity that relates 
negatively to its being-for-another, so there is no satisfaction in only existing as ‘I is I’ for 
self-consciousness.  There is no reality in ‘I is I’ because the relationship with the other is 
needed to exist in reality.  If the self is only the abstract Notion of ‘I is I’, the ‘I’ isn’t self- 
consciousness because the definition of self-consciousness we have discovered in this 
dialectic is that it must include otherness.  Through this presence of the other we 
recognize our otherness is for our self.  “This antithesis of its appearance and its truth has, 
however, for its essence only the truth, the unit y o f self-consciousness with itself; this 
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unity must become essential to self-consciousness, i.e. self-consciousness is Desire in 
general” (PhG 167). 
The satisfaction of Desire is the reflection of self-consciousness into itself, but the 
certainty of this reflection is really a double reflection or the duplication of self-
consciousness. Consciousness has for its object one which, of its own self, posits its 
otherness, or difference, as a nothingness and in so doing is independent.  The object of 
self-consciousness is equally independent in this negativity of itself and thus it is for itself 
a genus, a universal fluid element in the independence of its own separate being, it is a 
living self-consciousness.  A self-consciousness is a self-consciousness only in the fact 
that it exists for another self-consciousness, for only in this way does the unit y of itself in 
its otherness become explicit for it.  In recognizing an other is to recognize that ‘I’ have a 
being-for-other. The ‘I’ that is the object of its Notion is in fact not the ‘object’ of 
Desire.  A self-consciousness, in being an object, is just as much ‘I’ as ‘object’.  It is 
really the other self-consciousness that we desire, because this other self-consciousness is 
related to one’s own self-consciousness as the true object of desire.  The desire of an 
object cannot satisfy our desire because we then take away this object’s independence 
and consume it for ourselves, it then no longer relates to ourselves as an other, creating 
the need for more objects to fulfill our desire.  Since self-consciousness’ self-certainty is 
discovered in the supersession of objects, and self-consciousness cannot supersede the 
external objects of the world because of its negative relation to them, self-consciousness 
must seek its satisfaction of desire in an object that carries out this negation of itself in 
itself.  And because we must relate to an object that carries out this self-negation, which 
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is then also independent, this object is actually consciousness.  So self-consciousness 
achieves satisfaction of its desire only through another self-consciousness. 
Hegel can make this claim because Spirit develops its self-consciousness through 
the individual self-consciousnesses of the community, each self-consciousness 
recognizing itself in an other self-conscious individual, together recognizing each other.  
The being-for-itself and being-for-another of Spirit are determined through individual 
self-conscious agents. What still lies ahead for consciousness is the experience of what 
Spirit is – this absolute substance which is the unit y of the different independent self-
consciousnesses which, in their opposition, enjoy perfect freedom and independence; an 
‘I’ that is ‘We’ and a ‘We’ that is an ‘I’, we are free objects because we recognize each 
other’s independence.  “It is in self- consciousness, in the Notion of Spirit, that 
consciousness first finds its turning-point, where it leaves behind it the colorful show of 
the sensuous here-and-now and the nightlike void of the supersensible beyond, and steps 
out into the spiritual daylight of the present” (PhG 177). As we have seen, Hegel makes it 
clear that the relation between individual self-consciousnesses is needed for Spirit and 
this relation first begins to take place between two independent self-consciousnesses.  
“Self-consciousness exists in and for itself when, and by the fact, it so exists for another; 
that is, it exists only in being acknowledged” (PhG 178). This process of acknowledging 
or recognizing an other self-consciousness as independent is what we now must 
investigate.  The detailed exposition of the Notion of this spiritual unit y, of the 
independent self-consciousness also recognizing the other’s independence as their own, 
will present us with the process of Recognition.  This process of Recognition now 
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becomes necessary because spiritual unit y is only developed when all members of the 
community recognize each other as equal self-conscious individuals. The movement of 
Recognition, thus, will manifest itself though the opposition between self-
consciousnesses. “The upshot of this is that the agent takes himself to be an independent 
agent only in taking himself to be recognized by another as independent.  In being 
recognized as independent, his self-understanding (his being-for-self) is affirmed for him 
as being true, as being in line with what he really is (his being-in-itself)” (Pinkard 53). 
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CHAPTER III 
 Recognition of the Other Self-Consciousness 
Now that self-consciousness has come to see that a certainness of the self cannot 
be realized without an other self-consciousness, each self-consciousness in this 
relationship must recognize the other self-consciousness as not only existing for the 
recognition of one self-consciousness, but each self-conscious will need to be recognized 
as participating in this relationship so that each self-consciousness can be actualized.  
“Self-consciousness is now faced by an other self-consciousness; it has come out of 
itself” (PhG 179) because this self-consciousness superseded the other self-consciousness 
to become certain of his own being-for-self, of his own self-conscious, which has done 
away with the process of recognition of the mutually independent self-consciousness of 
the other.  Self-consciousness still only finds its satisfaction in being-for-itself, b y 
superseding the other self-consciousness, and by doing so fails to confirm its own 
independence by not recognizing the independence of the other self-consciousness. 
With this movement self-consciousness has lost itself because it finds itself in an 
other being and in doing so it has superseded the other because it does not see the other as 
the essential being, but in this other sees only its own self-consciousness, is for-itself and, 
as such, it negates all otherness.  Yet this self-consciousness is also for-an-other, 
specifically, for an other self-consciousness.  “It must supersede this otherness of itself, 
the other independent being to become certain of itself, but in doing so it supersedes its 
own self because this other is itself” (PhG 180).  One self-consciousness must supersede 
the other independent being, the other self-consciousness that presents itself to it, in order 
  
28 
to become certain of itself as the essential being, but, in doing so, it proceeds to supersede 
its own self, for this other is itself because self-consciousness only comes to know the 
truth of itself through the other, another independent self-consciousness.  “This 
ambiguous supersession of its ambiguous otherness is equally an ambiguous return into 
itself” (PhG 181).  Through this supersession self-consciousness receives back its own 
self because by superseding its otherness, it again becomes equal to itself; but the other 
self-consciousness equally gives it back again to itself, for it saw itself in the other, but 
supersedes this being of itself in the other and thus lets the other again go free and loses 
the recognition necessary for its independence and actualization. The satisfaction of 
desire has been compromised in this supersession of the other because desire really seeks 
itself in the other, one self-consciousness desires recognition from the other self- 
consciousness.  We must now realize that this movement of the relation between two 
self-consciousnesses must be equal to gain knowledge of ourselves b y using our 
knowledge of others and knowledge of the world.  Although the presence of the other 
independent self-consciousness is now realized by a self-consciousness, self-
consciousness must realize, and come to understand, that it exists in the relationship for 
the other self-consciousness as well, and this relationship cannot only exist in the 
negative fashion of supersession to establish each self-consciousnesses independence, but 
mutual recognition is needed for this establishment of independence of each self-
consciousness. 
“This movement of self-consciousness in relation to an other self-consciousness 
has in this way been represented as the action of one self-consciousness, but this action of 
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the one has the double significance of being both its own action and the action of the 
other as well” (PhG 182).  For the other self-consciousness is equally independent and 
self-contained, and there is nothing in it of which it is not itself the origin.  The first self-
consciousness does not have the object before it merely as it exists primarily for desire, 
but as something that has an independent existence of its own, which it cannot utilize for 
its own purposes if that object does, of its own accord, do what the first does to it.  Thus 
the movement is simply the double movement of the two self-consciousnesses.  Each sees 
the other do the same as it does; each does itself what it demands of the other, and 
therefore also does what it does only in so far as the other does the same.  Action by one 
side alone would be useless because what is to happen, this recognition of the relation 
between these independent self-consciousnesses, can only be brought about by the act ion 
of both.  The action has a double significance not only because it is directed against itself 
as well as against the other, but also because it is indivisibly the action of one self-
consciousness as well as the action of the other self-consciousness. 
In this movement we see repeated the process that presented itself as the play of 
Forces, but repeated now in consciousness.  The middle term in this movement is self- 
consciousness that splits into two extremes, each of which exchanges its own 
determinateness.  As consciousness it comes out of itself, yet, though out of itself it is at 
the same time kept back into itself, is itself, and, is for it.  Self-consciousness is aware 
that it is, and is not, another consciousness, and that this other is for itself only when it 
supersedes itself as being for itself, and for the other, an immediate being on its own 
account. These self-consciousnesses recognize themselves as mutually recognizing each 
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other.  This recognition will at first exhibit the inequality of the two self-consciousnesses, 
or the splitting up of the middle term into extremes that are opposed to one another, one 
only recognized and the other only recognizing. 
Each is for the other the middle term, through which each mediates itself with 
itself and unites with itself; and each is for itself, and for the other, an immediate being on 
its own account, which at the same time is such only through this mediation.  The y 
recognize themselves as mutually recognizing one another.  ‘I’ am a self-consciousness 
only if ‘I’ gain for myself recognition from another self-consciousness and if ‘I’ grant 
recognition of this other.  We have now to see how the process of this pure Notion of 
recognition, of the duplicating of self-consciousness in its oneness, appears to these two 
individual self-consciousnesses.  At first, it will exhibit the side of the inequality of the 
two, or the splitting-up of the middle term into the extremes which, as extremes, are 
opposed to one another, one self-consciousness being only recognized, the other self- 
consciousness only recognizing, as was stated above.  To begin with, self-consciousness 
is simple being-for-self, self-equal through the exclusion from everything else.  We like 
to think we are unique and that we have an unmediated ‘I’ with no comparison to others, 
with no mediation, but each ‘I’ thinks the same.  Its specificity falls into universality. 
The movement from the specific to the universal is the same because each ‘I’ is 
alone and unique, but ever y ‘I’ thinks this.  The dialectic with regard to the ‘I’ does not 
seem to take us further than that with regard to object.  Yet there is an advance, as 
Hyppolite claims, because there is not so much a juxtaposition between the universal 
and the specific as a more intimate interpretation, and this interpretation is the truth 
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toward which we are aiming.  What is ‘other’, or outside of itself, is negatively 
characterized as unessential.   But, this ‘other’ is also a self-consciousness; one individual 
is confronted by another individual self-consciousness.  They are for one another like 
ordinary objects, or things, independent shapes of consciousness which have not yet 
accomplished the movement of absolute abstraction, being the purely negative being of 
self-identical consciousness, superseding this negatively in the other and thus only 
recognizing itself in the other. They have not, as yet, exposed themselves to each other as 
being-for-itself or as self-consciousnesses.  Each self-consciousness is certain of its own 
self but not of the other and therefore its own self certainty has no truth as it has yet to be 
realized in the process of Recognition of the other. 
The ‘I’ discovers this other, and this other is a self, and as a result the ‘I’ sees 
itself in the other, but from this two things follow; (a) the individual ‘I’ has been lost 
because the ‘I’ finds itself as an other, the ‘I’ is for an other, and the other is for the ‘I’, 
(b) the ‘I’ has lost the other because the ‘I’ does not see the other as essence but only sees 
itself in the other.  This truth is only possible through recognition when each is for the 
other what the other is for it, when each in its own self through its own action and through 
the action of the other, achieves their being-for-self.  In so far as this recognition is the 
action of the other, each must seek the death of the other, and as we have seen earlier in 
the relationship between individual self-consciousnesses, the action of one self-
consciousness means this same action of the other self-consciousness, so this action must 
include the staking of one’s own life.  In other words, the meaning of organic life is 
death, the annihilation of everything that claims a separate subsistence from ‘your’ self- 
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consciousness.  The intuition of life as universal either is lost in the contingency of 
separate individuals or is present in them as the power that annihilates them, and which 
alone makes them actually alive.  “To try to reach this intuition of life as creative of ever-
new individualities or as destructive of these individualities is to submerge oneself in the 
night in which all cows are black” (Hyppolite 31). It would have truth only if its own 
being-for-self had confronted it as an independent object, or if the object had presented 
itself as this pure self-certainty.  But according to the Notion of recognition this is 
possible only when each is for the other what the other is for it, only when each in its 
own self through its own action, and again through the action of the other, achieves his 
pure abstraction of being-for-itself.  “Each takes his own subjective point of view as 
being the truth, and he simply maps the other’s point of view into his own, denying the 
validity of the other’s point of view when it conflicts with his own” (Pinkard 56). 
As was stated above, this presentation is a twofold action; action on the part of the 
other, and action on its own part.  Since each self-consciousness must reciprocate the 
action of the other to be recognized in its own independence, each seeks the death other. 
But in doing so, the second kind of action, action on its own part, is also involved; for the 
former involves the staking of its own life.  “Thus the relation of the two self- 
consciousness individuals is such that they prove themselves and each other through a 
life-and-death struggle” (PhG 187). The y must engage in this struggle, for the y must raise 
their certainty of being for themselves to truth, both in the case of the other and in their 
own case.  Each self-conscious individual wants to show that they are prepared to give up 
this otherness, give up their life for the other, which is this life-and-death struggle.  The 
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fight of each against all is a fight not only for life, but more importantly a fight for 
recognition and the realization of each individual self-conscious that this fight must take 
place to establish its independence, and this is struggle is what begins the master-slave 
relationship. 
Self-consciousness if for med in the relations of the struggle between opposed 
self-consciousnesses and that between master and slave, struggles which, properly 
speaking, are not temporal, although the y can be found at the origin of all human 
civilizations and reproduce themselves in different forms thought the history of humanity. 
Throughout history, these struggles between the so-called “ruling class” and their 
“slaves” or “serfs”, can be seen because it is only through staking one’s life that freedom 
is won; only thus is it proved that for self-consciousness, its essential being is not just 
being, not the immediate form in which it appears, not its submergence in the expanse of 
life, but rather that there is nothing present in it which could not be regarded as a 
vanishing moment, that it is only pure being-for-self.  This is the hermeneutical 
dimension of the slave’s existence that Russon claims can teach us a great deal about 
human existence because throughout the history of civilization, this struggle is present in 
the history of all cultures.  “The relationship of master and slave is also privileged 
because it marks the beginning of social existence, the beginning of the institution of life 
that is the natural environment of self-conscious selves…”(Russon 71).  The individual 
who has not risked his life may well be recognized as a person, but he has not attained to 
the truth of this recognition as an independent self-consciousness.  Similarly, just as each 
stakes his own life, so each must seek the other’s death, for it values the other no more 
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than itself; its essential being is presented to it in the form of an ‘other’, it is outside of 
itself and must rid itself of its self-externality.  The other is an immediate consciousness 
entangled in a variety of relationships, and must regard its otherness as a pure being-for-
itself or as an absolute negation.  It must seek the truth of its certainty; it must become 
self-consciousness, consciousness of its own knowledge rather than consciousness of the 
object, or only knowledge of an ‘other’.  But, the truth of the consciousness of the object 
is self-consciousness.  “Knowledge of the world is self-knowledge.  Certainty about the 
other becomes self-certainty.  The I takes itself as object by moving be yond the other” 
(Hyppolite 67). 
This trial by death between the two self-consciousnesses does away with the truth 
which was supposed to issue from it, and so, too, with the certainty of self.  For just as life 
is the natural setting of consciousness, independence without absolute negativity, so death 
is the natural negation of consciousness, negation without independence, which thus 
remains without the required significance of recognition.  Death certainly shows that each 
staked his life and held it of no account, both in himself and in the other; but for those 
who survive this struggle, the y put an end to their consciousness and are done away with 
as extremes wanting to be for themselves, or having an existence of their own.  With this 
the middle term collapses into a lifeless unity that is split into lifeless, unopposed 
extremes, and the two do not reciprocally and receive back from each other consciously.  
In this experience self-consciousness learns that Being is as essential to it as pure self- 
consciousness.  The dissolution of this unit y is the result of the first experience through 
which there is posited a pure self-consciousness and a consciousness that is not purely for 
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itself but for an other, consciousness still in the form of thinghood.  Both moments are 
essential since the y are unequal and opposed because their reflection into a unit y has not 
yet been achieved as the y still exist as two separate consciousnesses, one whose nature it 
is to be the independent consciousness whose essential nature is to be for itself, and the 
other is the dependent consciousness whose nature is to live, or to be, for an other.  The 
truth of this experience gives rise to another experience, that of relations of inequality in 
recognition, the former being the lord or master, the latter being the bondsman or slave. 
“Therefore, the life of the participants must be preserved in order for the desired 
resolution to come about” (Pinkard 59). 
Their entanglement is essential to the identity of each because one is only a fully 
developed individual b y establishing one’s identity through another individual, which 
then results in each individual establishing his, or her, identity within a community. Hegel 
argues that the self must come to acknowledge its dependence upon other selves, which 
means setting up mutually acceptable patterns of behavior that grant recognition to each 
other’s status as equally free self-conscious selves.  Robert Pippin claims that this is the 
very view that Hegel introduces in the “Independence and Dependence Self-
Consciousness” section where he “tried to establish the claim that the very possibility of 
practical self-determination, the possibility of being a person or a moral agent at all (what 
one commentator calls the possibility of ‘ego identity’, Ich-Identität), requires reciprocal 
recognition, or is possible only within a social community” (Pippin 154).  This process of 
recognition that leaves us with one conscious recognizing, and the other only being 
recognized, ends up leaving us with the need to explore the reasons for this inequality in 
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the two self-consciousnesses.  In order to overcome this inequality, to actualize 
consciousness for both individuals in true mutual recognition, this will then establish the 
freedom of self-conscious self’s in the social community. 
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CHAPTER IV 
The Master-Slave Relationship 
The relation of master and slave is the first form of the collective effort of self- 
consciousnesses to establish patterns of recognition; even though this proves to be an 
inadequate form, it introduces this institutionalization, the more adequate forms of which 
provide the foundation for the full development of the free self-consciousness.  “So the 
pursuit of knowledge will be conceived as participation in a social practice or institution, 
a rule-governed, collective, teleological activity” (Pippin 147).  Robert Pippin correctly 
claims that, in terms used by Hegel, this will mean the progressive elimination of bases of 
recognition linked to the mere exercise of power (the rule of the master or claims for a 
radical social ‘independence’) or abstract, or unreal, “beyond”, hopes expressed by those 
laboring in “dependence”, the servile lot of the slave.  This elimination of the exercise of 
power by the master and dependence of the slave is now necessary because if we agree 
that knowledge is only conceived by participating in a social practice, the mutual 
recognition of the members of this community is needed.  The result of the elimination of 
the exercise of power, genuine mutual recognition, will require a genuinely universal 
basis of recognition, a form of self-understanding that will again return us to Hegel’s 
account of “thought” and its “self-determinations” with the result of the religious 
community leading to philosophy, or Science, where the self recognizes the truth of itself 
in the conclusion of the Phenomenology of Spirit. 
The relation between master and slave, that we will soon examine, results from 
the struggle for recognition between self-consciousnesses, the struggle that was presented 
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in the previous pages.  “This passage already contains the contradiction inherent in the 
state of domination.  The master is master only because he is recognized by the slave; his 
autonomy depends on the mediation of another self-consciousness, that of the slave” 
(Hyppolite 173).  We must now investigate how this recognition begins between self-
consciousnesses based on a standard inequality that has developed from this struggle. 
The knowledge of the other involved in self-consciousness for Hegel is rooted in 
the violent terms of a dialectic between master and slave, which requires the latter’s fear 
and service.  “This feeling of independence is the primitive phenomenon of self-
consciousness, but it must be transformed if self-consciousness is to develop.  In 
particular, Hegel argues that the self must come to acknowledge its dependence upon 
other selves, which means setting up mutually acceptable patterns of behavior that grant 
due recognition to each other’s status as equally self-conscious selves” (Russon 72).  A 
situation of master y and servitude comes about when one of the fighters chooses to 
recognize the other as the master, and simultaneously acknowledges his/her dependence 
on life, and the other fighter chooses to recognize this recognition and accepts the first’s 
own self-subordination, in what was the life-and-death struggle for recognition between 
these self-consciousnesses.  As Hegel’s account shows, it is through the slave’s own 
successful actions that he/she builds “in her products a mirror—a reflection of—herself as 
free, that is, as an educated, powerful, desiring agent who has learned how to be objective 
and cooperative” (Russon 89).  Our employment of the slave to study objectivity is not 
arbitrary, because the situation of slaver y is, according to Hegel, one of the essential 
situations that comes into being within the natural development of self-consciousness. 
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In this previous experience (that is, in the beginning of the process of recognition), 
we have a self-consciousness that exists for itself, but no longer merely the Notion of 
such a consciousness.  Rather, it is a consciousness existing for itself, which is mediated 
with itself through another consciousness, i.e. through a consciousness whose nature it is 
to be bound up with an existence that is dependent, or thinghood in general.  This 
consciousness, what will become the consciousness of the master, puts himself into 
relation with both of these moments, to a thing as such, the object of desire, and to the 
consciousness for which thinghood is the essential characteristic, the consciousness of the 
slave.  And since he is qua the Notion of self-consciousness an immediate relation of 
being-for-self, but is now at the same time mediation, or a being-for-self , which is for 
itself only through another, he is related immediately to both, and mediately to each 
through the other. 
The master puts himself into relation with the consciousness of the slave as a 
thing, the object of Desire, because this consciousness has thinghood as its essential 
characteristic.  This consciousness is not experienced as the ‘I’ in the reflection of 
scientific thought, but in its impulses and their actualization, in the movement of its 
desires.  Consciousness is aimed at the other; self-consciousness aims at itself through the 
other; it is desire.  “It can be an I only insofar as it contraposes itself to another I and 
discovers itself in him, and it is in this still elementary form that consciousness develops 
as self-consciousness in the three relations of primitive social life (struggle for 
recognition, domination, and servitude).  In a higher form, self-consciousness becomes 
consciousness of its independence and freedom” (Hyppolite 67).  The only way for a 
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relationship of master and slave to emerge is for both self-consciousnesses to bend their 
wills from the original course of destroying each other in the life-and-death struggle and 
for both to choose to accept a situation of unequal recognition.  This fight was to prove to 
others, as well as to oneself, that one is an independent self-consciousness.  But, one can 
only prove that to oneself by proving it to others and by obtaining that proof from them. 
This is how each engages in a life and death struggle to realize their freedom and 
independence from the other because it is only through staking one’s life that freedom is 
won.  This is because without this struggle the y are indeed living individuals, but life 
comes to express itself in them only as an abstract universal, only as the negation of all 
particular determinations. 
The master relates himself mediately to the slave through a being; a thing that is 
independent, for it is just this thing which holds the slave in bondage because in the life 
and death struggle the slave couldn’t break free from this thing, or object, which proved 
his dependence by showing his independence really rested in thinghood.  The slave is, 
properly speaking, the slave not of the master, but of life.  He is a slave because he has 
retreated in the face of death, preferring servitude to liberty in death.  He is, therefore, less 
the slave of the master than of life.  When the slave submits to the master and accepts that 
he is the dependent consciousness, dependent on the master, the master does not directly 
relate to the slave, the slave is only a tool for the master and what the master relates to are 
the things created, or produced, by the slave.  “It is this chain from which he could not 
break free in the struggle, thus proving himself to be dependent, to possess his 
independence in thinghood”(PhG 190).  But the master is the power over this thing, for 
  
41 
he proved in the struggle that it is something merely negative; since the master is the 
power over this thing, or object, and this again is the power over the other; the slave, it 
follows that he holds the other in subjection.  The master relates himself to the slave 
through a thing that is independent, the thing that is produced by the slave through his 
working on it, and this same thing that holds the slave in bondage.  “The slave must learn 
to work with the things of the world in order to produce results that will satisfy the 
master. In place of the opposition on the basis of which the relation of master and slave is 
established, then, the relation of master and slave can be realized only through 
cooperation” (Russon 84).  Servile labor is the lot of the slave, who in that way arranges 
the world so that the master can negate it b y enjoying it. This negation of the master, or 
lord, grants him immediate self-certainty.  “But the master’s self-certainty in his 
dominance and his enjoyment is in fact mediated by the being of life, or by the slave. The 
truth of the master’s consciousness thus lies in the inessential consciousness of the slave” 
(Hyppolite 174).  The master relates himself mediately to the thing through the slave, 
who also relates himself negatively to the thing and takes away its (the things) 
independence.  The master requires the slave in order to relate to the objects of the world, 
those things produced by the slave.  But, at the same time, the thing is independent vis-à-
vis the slave whose negating of it cannot be altogether done with it to the point of 
annihilation, he only works on it.  For the master, on the other hand, the immediate 
relation of the thing becomes, through this mediation, the sheer negation of the thing, or 
the enjoyment of it.  The aspect of the thing’s independence he leaves to the slave who 
remains dependent on the object because of his working on it. 
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“T he slave works on things for the master, and thereby affirms for him that what counts in 
the world is what satisfies the master’s desires. But most importantly, the slave recognizes 
the master as the master and adjusts his own subjective point of view to fit the master’s 
point of view; he thus affirms for the master that his viewpoint on the world is true and that 
his self-conception as an independent agent is valid” (Pinkard 60). 
 
What desire failed to achieve, the master succeeds in doing, to have done away 
with the thing altogether, and to achieve satisfaction in the enjoyment of this thing, or 
object, produced by the slave through his work.  Desire failed to do this because of the 
thing’s independence; but the master, who has interposed the slave between this thing and 
himself, takes to himself only the enjoyment of it. 
In both of these moments the master achieves his recognition through an other by 
the other’s working on the thing and b y its dependence on the thing.  For in them, that 
other consciousness is expressly something unessential, both by its working on the thing, 
and by its dependence on a specific existence.  In neither case can it be lord over the 
being of the thing and achieve absolute negation of it.  This is the moment of recognition 
for this consciousness, the moment that the other consciousness puts aside its own being-
for-itself, and in so doing does what the first does to it.  And the other moment is also 
present because this action of the second consciousness is the first’s own action; because 
now it can be seen what the slave does is really the action of the master.  The master’s 
essential nature is to exist only for himself; he is the sheer negative power for whom the 
thing is nothing which makes him the essential action of this relationship, while the 
action of the slave is unessential.  What the master does to the other he also does to 
himself and what the slave does to himself he should also do to the other; because as we 
discussed previously, for self-consciousnesses to recognize each other, this requires the 
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action of each consciousness, and the other’s own action, which leaves the outcome a 
recognition that is one-sided and unequal. 
In this recognition the unessential consciousness of the slave is for the master the 
object, which constitutes the truth of his certainty of himself.  But it is clear that this 
object in which the master has achieved his lordship has in reality turned out to be 
something quite different from an independent consciousness.  What now really confronts 
the master is not his own independent consciousness, but a dependent one.  “To the extent 
that the master comes to realize this, he realizes that on his own terms he has failed.  He 
has not established his own subjective point of view as the truth; he has merely managed 
for contingent reasons to have the slave accept it as the true, with there being no further 
ground for the acceptance than the contingent fact that our of fear for his life, the slave 
opted to submit to the master” (Pinkard 60).  The master is, therefore, not certain of his 
being-for-self as the truth of himself because this truth is now the unessential 
consciousness and its unessential action.  The truth of the independent consciousness is 
the servile consciousness of the slave, servitude in its consummation has turned into the 
opposite of what it immediately was because it is a consciousness forced back into itself 
and is now transformed into a truly independent consciousness.  “Just as opposition 
among men leads to domination and servitude, so, by a dialectic reversal, domination and 
servitude lead to the liberation of the slave” (Hyppolite 171).  Although the master 
expresses the tautology ‘I=I’, immediate abstract self-consciousness, the slave expresses 
the mediation essential to self-consciousness, that which the master fails to achieve, and 
frees himself by consciously carrying out that mediation. Since the master cannot notice 
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the slave as an independent and free self-consciousness, the master’s own independence 
and free self-consciousness cannot be realized.  Now, after looking at what the slave is in 
relation to the master, we must consider what the slave is in, and for, himself. 
Servitude has the master as its essential reality, and its truth is the independent 
consciousness of the master.  But the consciousness of the slave is also a self-
consciousness, and we have now to consider what, as such, it is, in, and for, itself.  To 
begin with, servitude has the master for its essential reality; hence the truth for the slave is 
an independent consciousness that is for itself, the consciousness of the master.  
However, servitude is not yet aware that this truth is implicit in it, but it does contain 
within itself this truth of pure negativity and being-for-self because it has experienced this 
in its own nature.  The slave begins to struggle to understand the “significance of his 
labor and how that labor shall be determined (by him, not the Master, who grows 
increasingly dependent on the Slave’s expertise)”(Pippin 164).  This consciousness of the 
slave has been fearful, not of this or that particular thing, but its whole being has been 
seized with dread; for it has experienced the fear of death in the master to whom the slave 
submitted to in the life and death struggle.  In that experience it has been quite unmanned, 
has trembled in ever y fiber of its being, and everything solid and stable has been shaken 
to its foundations.  But this pure universal moment, the absolute melting-away of 
everything stable is the simple, essential nature of self-consciousness, absolute negativity, 
pure being-for-self, which consequently is implicit in this consciousness.  This moment 
of pure being-for-self is also explicit for the slave, for in the master it exists for him as his 
object.  Furthermore, his consciousness is not this dissolution of everything stable merely 
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in principle; in the slave’s service he actually brings this about. Through his service the 
slave rids himself of his attachment to natural existence in ever y single detail; and gets 
rid of it by working on it, by working on the objects of the world. Although the fear of the 
master is the beginning of wisdom, consciousness is only aware that it is a being-for-self 
by work, b y which the slave becomes conscious of what he truly is.  Fear and service 
cannot by themselves raise the slave’s self-consciousness to independence; it is his labor 
that transforms servitude into master y.  Not only does the slave shape himself by shaping 
the objects of the world that he works on, he also imprints the form of his self- 
consciousness on these objects, these shapes, and on being.  This is how in the product of 
his work, the slave finds himself. 
“The master has appeared to satisfy his desires in having the slave work over the things 
of the world for him.  The slave, however, in his working on things in order to satisfy the 
desires of the master, comes to see his own point o f view embodied in the artifacts of his 
work” (Pinkard 61). 
 
In the moment that corresponds to desire in the master’s consciousness, it did 
seem that the aspect of unessential relation to the thing fell to the lot of the slave, since in 
that relation the thing retained its independence.  Desire had reserved to itself the negating 
of the object and thereby its absolute feeling of self.  This is the very reason why this 
satisfaction is only a fleeting one because it lacks the side of objectivity and permanence. 
As has been said previously, work is desire held in check and work forms and shapes the 
thing.  The negative relation to the object becomes something permanent because it is for 
the working consciousness, for the slave, that the object has independence.  This negative 
middle term is at the same time the individual or pure being-for-itself of consciousness, 
which now, in the work outside of it, acquires an element of permanence that Desire 
  
46 
failed to achieve.  It is in this way that the consciousness of the worker, of the slave, 
comes to see its own independence in the independent object that it works on.  In the 
master, the being-for-self is an ‘other’, for the slave, it is only for him; in fear the being-
for-self is present in the slave himself.  In fashioning the thing through his work the slave, 
the self-consciousness in subjection, becomes aware that being-for-self belongs to him, 
that he himself exists essentially and actually in his own right.  Through this rediscovery 
of himself, the slave realizes that it is in his work wherein he seemed to have only an 
alienated existence that he acquires his own consciousness and his own freedom. 
This relation of the master and slave has not only this positive significance that in 
it the pure being-for-self of the servile consciousness acquires an existence; it also has, in 
contrast with its first moment, the negative significance of fear.  In the fashioning of the 
thing, the slave’s own negativity, his being-for-self, becomes an object for him only 
through his setting at naught the existing shape confronting him.  But this objective 
negative moment is none other than the alien being before which it has trembled.  Now, 
the slave destroys this alien negative moment, posits himself as a negative in the 
permanent order of things, and thereby becomes for himself, someone existing on his 
own account.  In the master, the being-for-self is an ‘other’, for the slave, it is only for 
him; in fear, the being-for-self is present in the slave himself; and this is why in 
fashioning the thing, he becomes aware that being-for-self belongs to him, that he himself 
exists essentially and actually in his own right.  The labor of the slave thus attains the 
authentic realization of being-for-itself in being-in-itself.  The thingness before which the 
slave had trembled is eliminated, and what appears in that element of thingness is pure 
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being-for-itself of consciousness.  Through labor, through the slaves shaping of objects of 
the world, the slave’s self-consciousness rises to its self-intuition in being.  Self-
consciousness has thus become self-consciousness in universal being, it has become 
thought.  The master must thus come to acknowledge this in the slave and learn to map 
his own point of view on that of the slave who is emerging as independent.  The shape 
the slave has created through his labor does not become something other than himself for 
the slave, through being made external to him; for it is precisely this shape that is his pure 
being-for-self, which in this externality is seen by him to be the truth.  Through this 
rediscover y of himself by himself, the slave realizes that it is precisely in his work 
wherein he seemed to have only an alienated existence that he acquires a mind of his own.  
“It is b y laboring, transforming the world in the service of the Master (finally the ultimate 
Master, death), a labor that requires a determinate understanding of nature, and 
knowledge of itself, that a truly independent and so self-determining self-consciousness 
arises” (Pippin 162). 
For this reflection, the two moments of fear and service as such, and also that of 
formative activity in working on the objects of the world, are necessary for the slave to 
realize his or her independence.  Without the discipline of service and obedience, fear 
remains at the formal stage, and does not extend to the known real world of existence. 
Without the formative activity fear remains inward and mute, and consciousness does not 
become explicitly for itself.  If consciousness fashions the thing without that initial 
absolute fear, it is only an empty self-centered attitude; for its form or negativity is not 
negativity per se, and therefore its formative activity cannot give it a consciousness of 
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itself as essential being.  If it has not experienced absolute fear, but only some lesser 
dread, the negative being has remained for it something external, its substance has not 
been infected by it through and through.  Since the entire contents of its natural 
consciousness has not been jeopardized and threatened, determinate being still in 
principle attaches to it; having a mind of one’s own is self-will, a freedom that is still 
enmeshed in servitude. 
For the independent self-consciousness, it is only the pure abstraction of the ‘I’ 
that is its essential nature, and, when it does develop its own differences, this 
differentiation does not become a nature that is objective and intrinsic to it.  Thus this 
self-consciousness does not become an ‘I’ that in its simplicity is genuinely self-
differentiating, or that in this absolute differentiation remains identical with itself.  On the 
other hand, the consciousness that is forced back into itself becomes, in its formative 
activity, its own object in the form of the thing it has fashioned, and at the same time sees 
in the master a consciousness that exists as a being-for-self.  But for the subservient 
consciousness, these two moments—itself as an independent object, and this object as a 
mode of consciousness and hence its own essential nature—fall apart.  Since the form and 
the being-for-self are for us, or in themselves, the same and since in the Notion of 
independent consciousness the intrinsic being is consciousness, the moment of intrinsic 
being, or thinghood, which received its form in being fashioned is no other substance than 
consciousness.  “We are in the presence of self-consciousness in a new shape, a 
consciousness which, as the infinitude of consciousness or as its own pure movement, is 
aware of itself as an essential being, a being which thinks or is a free self-
  
49 
consciousness”(PhG 197).   
To think does not mean to be an abstract ‘I’, but an ‘I’ which has at the same time 
the significance of intrinsic being, or having itself for object, or of relating itself to 
objective being in such a way that its significance is the being-for-self of the 
consciousness for which it is an object.  In thinking, the object does not present itself in 
picture-thoughts but in Notions, i.e. in distinct being-in-itself or intrinsic being, 
consciousness being immediately aware that this is not anything distinct from itself.  
What is pictured, or figuratively conceived, what immediately is, and this distinction, in 
so far as it is present in consciousness itself, is its determinate content; but since this 
content is at the same time a content grasped in thought, consciousness remains 
immediately aware of its unit y with this determinate and distinct being, not, as in the case 
of a picture-thought, where consciousness still has specially to bear in mind that this is its 
picture-thought; on the contrary, the Notion is for me straightway my Notion.  In thinking, 
I am free, because I am not in an other, but remain solely in communion with myself.  
The object, which is for me the essential being, in undivided unit y my being-for-myself; 
and my activity in conceptual thinking, is a movement within myself.  It is essential, 
however, in characterizing this shape of self-consciousness to bear firmly in mind that it 
is thinking consciousness in general, that its object is an immediate unit y of being-in-
itself and being-for-itself, which can only be achieved through the process of 
Recognition.  B y considering this new form of self-consciousness on its own terms, and 
addressing the themes of desire and work of the master and the slave, we can understand 
both why the situation of slaver y emerges and why it is inadequate as an ultimate stance 
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of free self-consciousness and why mutual recognition alone will lead us to a free self-
consciousness. 
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CHAPTER V 
 
Freedom Found in Mutual Recognition 
 
In this process of recognition in the master and slave dialectic, we have seen that 
the slave recognizes his independence in his work in that he is compelled to produce an 
object (a) because of the fear of the master and (b) through the deferment of his desire. 
Since the master’s desires are fulfilled by the slave in the things the slave produces for the 
master, the master becomes dependent on the slave and is no longer an independent self-
consciousness.  The slave develops freedom from nature in his work and then the slave 
recognizes he no longer needs the master to fulfill his development as a free-self-
consciousness.  In the slave’s labor, he has realized he is no longer dependent on the 
object or on the master.  Through his work he has realized himself, realized these objects 
of the world around him are for him, for him in the sense that they are there for him to 
place his being-in-itself onto the world to unite his being-in-itself and being-for-itself of 
his self-consciousness.  Through the slave’s work he has done away with the desire that 
reserved to itself the negating of the object and this negation now brings about the 
permanence of the object in its independence. Essential importance no longer attaches to 
the difference as a specific thing, or as consciousness of a specific natural existence, as a 
feeling, or as desire and its object, whether this is posited by thought, or the difference 
that from the very beginning is not distinct from myself. This consciousness accordingly 
has a negative attitude towards the master and slave, or lord and bondsman, relationship. 
As lord, it does not have its truth in the bondsman, nor as bondsman is its truth in the lords 
will and in his service; on the contrary, whether on the throne or in chains, in the utter 
dependence of its individual existence, its aim is to be free, and to maintain that lifeless 
indifference which steadfastly withdraws from the bustle of existence, alike from being 
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active as passive, into the simple essentiality of thought (PhG 199). 
 
The self-consciousness that is the result of the master-slave dialectic has created 
the possibility for the slave to understand that his status as a slave is the result of his 
coming to accept the subjective point of view of the master as his own point of view. The 
master’s point of view becomes dominant because the slave must accept this point of 
view, fearing as he does for his life in the initial struggle for recognition.  The slave, as 
Hegel puts it, comes to understand that he has a certain type of freedom within himself. 
“This means that not only is the labor of the Slave progressively rationalized – the Slave 
masters nature more successfully and so actually establishes his independence from it, the 
condition for a free self-determination – but he begins to struggle to understand the 
significance of his labor and how that labor shall be determined (by him not the Master, 
who grows increasingly dependent on the Slave’s expertise)”(Pippin 164). 
Hegel continues to present the unresolved dialectic of independence and 
dependence, master and slave, in this newly fashioned language of “thought”.  Since the 
slave cannot count his new position as thinking laborer as resolution to the struggle for 
recognition, the slave’s growing independence contradicts his position of dependence 
that began this relationship between the independent self-consciousness of the master and 
the dependent self-consciousness of the slave that resulted from the life and death 
struggle of these two self-consciousnesses.  Hegel must now explore the possible forms 
of such an independent level of thought.  It was coming to see that his slaver y rested on 
the fact that he chose life over recognition in the life and death struggle that the slave 
acquired the possibility of becoming a stoic or skeptic.  Self-will is the freedom which 
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entrenches itself in some particularity and is still in bondage, while Stoicism is the 
freedom which always comes directly out of bondage and returns into the pure 
universality of thought. “The independence of the master and the harsh education of the 
slave become the self-mastery stoic who is always free, regardless of circumstances or 
the hazards of fortune, or the skeptic’s experience of absolute liberty, which dissolves 
ever y position except that of the I itself” (Hyppolite 157).  As a universal form of the 
World-Spirit, Stoicism could only appear on the scene in a time of universal fear and 
bondage, but also at a time of universal culture which had raised itself to the level of 
thought, or a free self- consciousness. 
“Thus, neither the master nor the slave ends up where he intended. The dialectic of master 
and slave was initiated b y each identifying his own projects as authoritative for what 
counted as good reasons for belief and action, but each has no w found that he cannot 
identify what is his own without reference to the other’s point of view – without, that is, 
reference to the sociality common to both”(Pinkard 62). 
 
The necessity of a common, ‘objective’ point of view is thus established out of the 
dialectic of master and slave, because the relationship with the other ‘I’ that is desired by 
self-consciousness was seen to be the ‘object’ of its initial desire, and this view is the 
social view of the community that is World Spirit, although that common point of view 
has not yet been full y achieved.  The earlier social account of recognition that exhibited 
the inequality of the relating self-consciousnesses that are opposed to one another, one 
only being recognized and the other only recognizing, and the general Hegelian claim that 
the realization of my own freedom depends on a successfully recognition of the freedom 
of others, do indeed play important roles as we move through this development of the 
Phenomenology of Spirit.  
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From our analysis of the slave, we have seen why an adequate self-interpretation 
cannot portray us as slaves, namely, because we have a hermeneutical initiative, an 
instinct, a natural impulse, that is, we are free.  Our self-conscious was not meant to exist 
only for an other, our freedom can only be realized by the freedom that exists in other 
self-consciousnesses.  “Tested through anguish and discipline by service, self-
consciousness became the form which found its matter in being-in-itself and inscribed 
itself therein. Being-in-itself and being-for-itself are then no longer separate. Self-
consciousness now gains not only living independence but also liberty, which pertains to 
thought” (Hyppolite 178).  Since the freedom of the individual self-consciousness has 
now been established in the mater-slave dialectic, self-consciousness now goes through 
the remaining steps of the Phenomenology of Spirit ; to a point where appearance becomes 
identical with essence, so that its exposition will coincide at just this point with the 
authentic Science of Spirit. And, finally, when consciousness itself grasps this, its own 
essence, it will signify the nature of absolute knowing itself, Science that can account for 
itself.  For this self-consciousness the essence is neither an other than itself, nor the pure 
abstraction of the ‘I’, but an ‘I’ which has the otherness of itself within itself, though in 
the form of thought, so that in its otherness it has directly returned into itself.  Freedom in 
thought has only pure thought as its truth, a truth lacking the fullness of life, and this is 
why freedom in thought is only the Notion of freedom, not the living reality of freedom 
itself.  This thinking consciousness as determined in the form of abstract freedom is thus 
only the incomplete negation of otherness.  This is whey Hegel makes the claim that 
Skepticism is the realization of that of which Stoicism was only the Notion, and is the 
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actual experience of what the freedom of thought is.  The Skeptic “exhibits the dialectical 
movement which Sense-certainty, Perception, and the Understanding each is; as also the 
unessential character of what, in the relationship of lord and bondsman, and for the 
abstract thinking itself, is held to be a determinate element”(PhG 123). 
What Skepticism causes to vanish is not only objective reality as such, but its own 
relationship to it, in which the other is held to be objective and is established as such and 
it then loses the truth that it had established.  Through this self-conscious negation it 
acquires for its own self the certainty of its freedom, and by generating the experience of 
this freedom it raises it to truth. The Skeptical self-consciousness thus experiences in the 
flux of all that would stand secure before it, its own freedom as given and preserved by 
itself.  What this self-consciousness failed to realize is that without the process of 
recognition, “consciousness itself is the absolute dialectical unrest, this medley of 
sensuous and intellectual representations whose differences coincide, and whose identity 
is equally again dissolved, for it is itself determinateness as contrasted with the non- 
identical”(PhG 124).  This consciousness is therefore the unconscious, thoughtless 
rambling that passes back and forth from the one extreme of self-identical self- 
consciousness to the other extreme of the contingent consciousness, which is both 
bewildered and bewildering.  At one time this consciousness recognizes that its freedom 
lies in rising above all the confusion and contingency of existence and at another equally 
admits to a relapse into occupying itself with what is unessential. “In Stoicism, self- 
consciousness is the simple freedom of itself.  In Skepticism, this freedom becomes a 
reality, negates the other side of determinate existence, but really duplicates itself, and 
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now knows itself to be a duality.  Consequently, the duplication which formerly was 
divided between two individuals, the lord and the bondsman, is now lodged into 
one”(PhG 206). 
This duplication gives rise to the Unhappy Consciousness, consisting of the 
Unchangeable which is related to the Divine aspect of being, and the Changeable which is 
our self-consciousness’ relation to the world.  Although this consciousness first 
recognizes itself as the Changeable it sees that although it treats the Unchangeable as an 
alien being, it becomes aware that this consciousness has its own essence and is therefore 
an unchangeable consciousness as well.  “The Unchangeable that enters into 
consciousness is through this very fact at the same time affected by individuality, and is 
only present with the latter; individuality, instead of having been extinguished in t he 
consciousness of the Unchangeable, only continues to arise there from”(PhG 127).  In 
this movement consciousness experiences the emergence of individuality in the 
Unchangeable, and the Unchangeable in individuality b y becoming aware of individuality 
in general in the Unchangeable and, at the same time, becoming aware of its own 
individuality.  At first the Unchangeable is viewed as being opposed to individuality in 
general; but being itself an individual, it is opposed to another individual; and finally, it is 
one with the individual.  The unhappy consciousness is the unit y of pure thinking and 
individuality.  It knows itself to be this thinking individuality, or pure thinking, and knows 
the Unchangeable itself essentially as an individuality.  “But what it does not know is that 
this object, the Unchangeable, which it knows essentially in the form of individuality, is 
its own self, is itself in the individuality of consciousness”(PhG 131). Now that 
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consciousness has come to realize its freedom in pure thinking, the importance of the 
individual that is developed through a free self-consciousness that is found in an other 
self-consciousness, can be seen as the beginnings of true individuality. 
As we have seen, we need this other; we need the relationship developed between 
two free self-consciousnesses in the master and slave dialectic, to complete our individual 
development as a free self-consciousness through this process of recognition by an other 
self-consciousness.  As Russon correctly notes, the hermeneutical situation of the slave 
reveals to us that the only way we can be objective, which means the only way we can 
live up to the necessarily compelling demands of intersubjective life, is by mutually 
establishing systems of equal recognition, which means by establishing communal 
systems of freedom.  The intersubjective nature of self-consciousness entails the need to 
institute relations amongst ourselves in which all the participants are recognized as equal 
participants. Since we now recognize that this other is, in fact, needed for our own 
freedom, we see that our original choices are communal rather than singular, and they are 
compelling to our will rather than subordinate to it.  The community must be made up of 
free individuals who recognize each other as equally being free.  It is only in this mutual 
recognition of ourselves as free individuals that we each acquire our own freedom. 
If it is b y knowledge of the world that we gain knowledge of ourselves, and knowledge of 
the world is knowledge of other objects, other self-consciousnesses, who only become 
self-consciousnesses by recognizing free self-consciousnesses, then we all must be free 
for this process of recognition to take place.  ‘I’ need to first become free in order for 
others to become free, and the ‘other’ must be free for me to become free, the ‘I’ that is 
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‘We’, and the ‘We’ that is an ‘I’.  We need to conceptualize the nature of our free self-
conscious self in such a way that we define ourselves neither as the master or the slave.  
What one does is the skill and customary practice of all, the labor of the individual for his 
own needs is just as much a satisfaction of the needs of others as of his own, and the 
satisfaction of his own needs is only obtained through the labor of others.  As the 
individual in his individual work already unconsciously performs a universal work, so 
again he also performs the universal work as his conscious object; the whole becomes, his 
own work, for which he sacrifices himself and precisely in doing so receives back from it 
his own self.  “This unit y of being-for-another or making oneself a Thing, and of being-
for-self, this universal substance, speaks its universal language in the customs and laws 
of its nation”(PhG 351). 
The free human agent is the one implied by Hegel’s argument that in the form of 
communal self-recognition is the fundamental phenomenon of a free self-consciousness. 
The concept of community that keeps making its appearance thought the developmental 
process of a free self-consciousness first begins to take place in the conscious 
development of perception when the sense-certainty account of objects is understood to 
be a universal property o f this object, and only in relation to others is the object 
determinate.  Even in the initial stages of consciousness itself, understanding can only 
take place by recognizing a multiplicity as a unit y.  Just as in to achieve the freedom of 
self-consciousness, individual self-consciousnesses must recognize each other in a social 
community to truly become free.  As we have seen in a self-consciousness’ journey of 
realizing itself as an individual self-consciousness, we realize that self-consciousness can 
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only exist in relation to an other self-consciousness when both recognize each other. The 
inequality of this relationship first falls into one self-consciousness being recognized, the 
other self-consciousness only recognizing, and the final realization that although we 
began seeking our individuality from objects, and each other, to establish our freedom in 
the world, it was only through mutual recognition between ourselves, and other free self-
consciousnesses in a social community where we, as self-conscious individuals, find our 
contentment, and satisfaction, that is our freedom.  In the Universal Spirit each has only 
the certainty of himself, of finding in the actual world nothing but himself; he is as certain 
of the others as he is of himself.  The individual is a required piece of the puzzle to find 
our truth and in reaching Universal Spirit.  The pleasure of the self-conscious exists in 
uniting itself to its object and the ‘other’, in order to realize Universal Spirit.  Spirit 
develops its self-conscious though the individual self-consciousnesses of the community, 
each self-consciousness recognizing itself in another self-consciousness individual, 
together recognizing each other.  This shows us that individual claims must be made in a 
universal, or social, view.  Socially we depend on the judgment of others, but the 
individual must be able to conform or guide his conscious actions in accordance to 
others.  In the process of the individual consciousness to realize that its being-in-itself and 
its being-for-itself are one and the same, by investigating our subjective structures, by 
investigating the world which is our relation to others, our independence from the other, 
and the unit y with the other that is self-consciousness, we see you cannot have individual 
freedom without a social community, and you cannot have a social community without 
free individuals; mutual recognition.  We discover each other and ourselves as we truly 
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were meant to be; free in, with, and for each other. 
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